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Japanese Company’s Cultural Shift for
Gender Equality at Work
TOMOKO HAMADA
Department of Anthropology, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, USA

ABSTRACT The article provides an overview of Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s womanomics
policy for gender equality (GD), and poses a question as to why despite a large amount of GD
initiatives, Japan’s GD progress has been painfully slow. It then introduces an ethnography of
the GD implementation by a Japanese multinational ﬁrm (2013–2017). It analyzes the ﬁrm’s
pedagogical effort to correct the unconscious cultural bias to retool the existing habitus of
managers and employees. The ﬁrm’s cultural strategies parallel its human resources (HR)
reforms in its attempt to change organizational norms regarding how corporate men and women
should work. Deploying theoretical perspectives of cultural neuroscience, semiotics, learning
theory and interpretive anthropology, the author then identiﬁes seven strategic foci for this
ﬁrm’s cultural transformation, and terms this habitus-shifting program as MRS-PARC: M =
magical messages and messengers; R = rites of passage and rituals; S = signs and symbols;
P = rewarding and punishing task performances; A = clarifying alternatives and affordance;
R = dealing with unexpected results, resistance and rear guards; and C = communication,
complexity and continuity. Once MRS-PARC starts, corporate social drama and critical
incidents lead the observer to the nexus of symbolic resistance and representation that in turn
helps clarify how to modify the existing accommodation-and-redress mechanism for reform.
MRS-PARC offers an empirically derived, action-oriented, process-based, analysis for those
interested in moderating the people’s referential frameworks and cognitive/emotional
orientations for organizational transformation.
KEY WORDS: Habitus-retooling; gender equality; Japanese multinational; applied business
anthropology; industrial ethnography; diversity strategy; organizational transformation
JEL CLASSIFICATIONS: Z1; K38; J0

Introduction
Japan lags behind many countries in terms of female leadership both in politics and in
business.1 World Economic Forum that annually ranks nations in terms of gender
equality placed Japan at the 111th (below Ethiopia and Nepal) in global gender-equality index, and 118th in terms of women’s economic participation and opportunity
(2016). An OECD report of 2016 noted that tapping into the underutilized talent
pool of qualiﬁed women could give companies a boost and foster inclusive growth.
Correspondence Address: Department of Anthropology, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA,
USA. Email: thamad@wm.edu
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Achieving parity in labor force participation rates between men and women in OECD
countries could boost GDP by 12% in the next 20 years (OECD, 2016). It noted that
effective practices for gender equality largely depend on the top management commitment to drive the change, and continuous monitoring within the company for progress
(OECD, 2016). It recommended that we must address the complex social challenges
undermining women’s access to leadership that include skewed perceptions and
unconscious biases. It advocated for cultural and behavioral change in company
culture.
The present article ﬁrst provides the reader with an overview of Japan’s political and
legal environment for gender equality. It then describes the so-called womanomics
initiated by Prime Minister Abe in 2013 and analyzes the reasons why, despite
many legal changes and governmental programs, progress has been slow. The
author concludes that if one wishes to transform any organizational culture successfully, one must ﬁrst deploy various pedagogical tools to shift the unconscious cultural
bias held by men and women. In next sections, the author discusses Sekai’s implementation of its GD policy. The reader will understand how a major GD catalyst derived
from Sekai top leaders’ effort to retool the people’s habitus, in tandem with changing
institutional practices. Habitus, according to Bourdieu, is a system of embodied disposition, tendencies that organize the ways in which individuals perceive the social world
around them and react to it (1980, 1984).2 Corporate habitus is like an unconsciously
held cultural GPS for managers and workers to view, ﬁlter, understand, evaluate and
guide actions and practices.
In 2013, the author who is a native Japanese professor of anthropology at an American university joined a Japanese multinational, Sekai Foods (pseudonym), as its ﬁrst
female external board member. She conducted ethnographic ﬁeldwork and recorded
Sekai’s gender-diversity (GD) policy implementation between 2013 and 2017. The
ﬁnal discussion summarizes what one can learn from the habitus-modiﬁcation procedure of Sekai. Deploying theoretical perspectives of cultural neuroscience, semiotics,
learning theory and interpretive anthropology, the author identiﬁes key domains of
this ﬁrm’s GD strategies, and terms them as “MRS-PARC”, that stands for: M =
magical messages and messengers; R = rites of passage and rituals; S = signs and
symbols; P = rewarding and punished GD-related task performances; A = clarifying
alternatives and GD affordance; R = reading the unexpected and dealing with rear
guards and resistance; and C = communication, cooperation and complexity. MRSPARC opens a pragmatic, action-oriented, empirical vista for those leaders who are
interested in organizational cultural transformation and who are in search of key cultural elements for realizing gender equality.3
Japan’s Womanomics4
In December 2016, 127 million Japanese people reached a somber milestone when
fewer than one million babies (981,000) were born in that year. With declining birth
rates and almost no signiﬁcant immigration, Japan’s population is predicted to
decrease by 30% to 88 million by 2060, and the elderly ratio will surge to 40% of
the total. Facing the grim prospect of shrinking working-age people who will have
to bear social security, nationalized medical expenses and tax burdens, Prime Minister
(PM) Shinzo Abe announced in 2013 that more women would be encouraged to work.
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He set a goal of 30% female leadership rate in listed companies by 2020. Behind the
PM’s womanomics was the relatively low female labor participation rate at around
63% in 2013, because 70% of women quit work when they had their ﬁrst child, and
did not return to work for a decade or more.5
After the launch of womanomics, several legal measures were introduced, including
the Intensive Policy to Accelerate the Empowerment of Women, the new Corporate
Governance Code, the Act on Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement
in the Workplace. The Basic Plan for Gender Equality based on Article 13 of the Basic
Act for Gender Equality Society; the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Improved
Working Conditions for Dispatched, and the Positive Action Policies, similar to afﬁrmative action programs in the United States and Europe (Japanese Government,
Gender Equality Bureau 2016a, 2016b, 2017).
The government ﬁnancially helps new mothers, who, unlike American mothers,
receive 58 weeks of maternity leave, 26 of which are paid. Fathers are entitled to the
same amount of time off, though less than 2% actually take it. Abe also pledged to
create 400,000 new daycare spaces nationwide by 2018. Desperate for more babies,
the government pays Japanese parents additional child allowances.
By mid-2010s, Japan’s economy started to recover, and more Japanese women
began returning to work. The number of female workers reached 24.36 million in
2014, up from 15.48 million in 1985. According to the latest OECD data, Japan’s
female labor participation rate hit 64.0% in 2014, up from 63% in 2013, which was
the highest level in the past 15 years (OECD 2016, 2017). At the same time, the unemployment rate for women seeking jobs dropped to 3.5% in 2014, down from 4.4% in
2011. Although Japan’s labor participation rate of 64.0% rate in 2014 was lower
than those of Norway (75.9%) and Switzerland (79%), it was higher than United
States (63%), Italy (55.2%), and South Korea (57.0%). The Japanese employment
rate has increased at a faster pace since 2007 than the OECD average. This strong performance largely reﬂects the rising participation of women and the elderly in the labor
market.
The increase of female labor participation appeared all positive. However, there
was a major problem because womanomics coincided with the amendment of
Rodosha haken-ho or the Labor Dispatch Law that introduced deregulatory
measures for companies to use more ﬂexible contractual arrangements to hire and
ﬁre workers, instead of giving them full-time, regular status.6 The contract
workers with little or no job security are part-timers (who may work up to 35
hours per week), temporary workers, seasonal workers, and those engaged in
naishoku (work at home). Recent job creation has largely taken the form of nonregular employment reinforcing concerns about labor market dualism. Despite the
idealistic rhetoric of womanomics, PM Abe’s “reforms” disproportionately put
women, young workers, less educated and older workers into the category nonregular contract workers. Back in 1985, only 16.4% of all workers were non-regulars.
However, by 2010, the number of non-regulars had more than doubled to 34.3%,
and to 40% in 2016.
In 2016, for the ﬁrst time, the number of female workers and older non-regulars
exceeded the number of regular full-time male workers. Today, nearly 60% of
working women are non-regulars, with little chance of moving up the corporate

66

T. Hamada

ladder. These women earn far less than regular male workers. In 2016, female nonregulars earned only half (50.8%) of the regular male workers. In Europe, the ﬁgure
was about 80%. Breaking down this highly gendered dualism in the Japanese labor
market is essential to achieving better quantity and quality of employment.
Despite the prime minister’s 2013 initial goal of 30% of female leadership rate to be
achieved by 2020, the fourth governmental plan in December 2015 readjusted the
target downward to a rather modest 10%. What happened? You may ask. An ethnographic inquiry by this author reveals social reality behind the above-mentioned statistical numbers. In the next section, let us examine engendered corporate reality in
some details, using the case of Sekai Foods.
Sekai’s Engendered Employment System
Most large Japanese ﬁrms hire fresh university graduates as sogoshoku or managerial
candidates once a year. Sogoshoku receives salaries and semi-annual bonuses, various
allowances, beneﬁts, training opportunities, and most importantly, job security (until
retirement at age 70). The term sogoshoku was created when the Equal Employment
Opportunities Law (EEOL) was enacted in 1986. Prior to 1986 most ﬁrms practiced
blatant discrimination against women because only males were hired as managerial
candidates, while women served as their assistants and were expected to quit when
they married.7 After the EEOL of 1986, the sogoshoku category was newly created
to give women promotional opportunities and to separate this group of male and
female managerial cadres from ippanshoku non-careers. Thus, for the ﬁrst time, a
small band of female college graduates were hired as sogoshoku.8 The 1986 EEOL
has been revised twice: the ﬁrst revision in 1997 aimed at ending discrimination in
recruiting, hiring, job placement, and promotion, and the second in 2006–2007 targeted sexual harassment.
Even after the EEOL, however, many companies continued to hire far more male
than female graduates as sogoshoku. As a result, the available pool of female managerial candidates is quite limited even in large ﬁrms. Today most large ﬁrms have two
paths for women, carrier track sogoshoku and non-career ippanshoku. From the perspective of an individual female worker, the sogoshoku–ippanshoku duality is a
classic example of competing devotions, to career or to family (Blair-Loy, 2009).
Sogoshoku scheme of work devotion (applied mostly to men until recently) requires
single-minded allegiance to careers that are supposed to give meaning and purpose
to life. Sogoshoku is expected to work long hours, take any assignments, transfer to
any locations, and work until retirement.
One ex-sogoshoku male manager noted that an announcement of job transfer was
similar to receiving a military draft letter. One had no choice but to accept the new
assignment regardless of personal circumstances. Another male manager noted that
as soon as he bought a house, he received an order to transfer to a new location.
When the new location is far away from the employee’s current residence, it is
common, particularly for middle-aged, married, male sogoshoku and managers with
children, to choose tanshin-funin or “single transfer without accompanying
family”.9 While those middle-aged pseudo-bachelors work at new locations, domestic
of overseas often for several years, their wives stay behind to look after their children
and/or, increasingly, their aging parents and in-laws. Tanshin-funin literally splits
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the employee’s family into two locations with a gendered division of paid and unpaid
labor.
Most women do not see tanshin-funin as an attractive life choice, and many young
female college graduates voluntarily opt for ippanshoku or assistant positions, excluding themselves from promotional opportunities even when the company is willing to
give such chances. The women’s logic to apply for or stay as ippanshoku is that they
do not want the stress and demand placed upon sogoshoku men and women and
that ippanshoku non-careers could still enjoy secure employment until retirement. A
few ippanshoku women who want to become sogoshoku are single women without
familial obligations or single mothers (heads of households) who need income.
Overburdened by the demanding work hours and familial obligations, many
sogoshoku women get burnt-out and quit their jobs in mid-career. According to the
2016 Kyodo News, 80% of the roughly 1000 women hired as sogoshoku after the
EEOL of 1986 had already quit the job as of 2016. Many women face the unsurmountable hurdles against careers that include notoriously long working hours, chronic
shortage of daycare services for their children, and little help from husbands who
also work long hours. It is also known that some employers place subtle or outright
pressure on women to quit when they become pregnant. Several young female interviewees who were single in Sekai noted that although they actually want to marry,
having a husband, children or aging in-laws at home while working as sogoshoku
means that they would have to endure double or triple shifts, which was not realistic.
Women used to account for about 40% of all regular employees in Sekai before
2011, but among women, only16% were sogoshoku, and only 6% of women were managers, while 78% were ippanshoku. The percentage of female managers (deﬁned as
section chiefs or above) among all managers stood at 10.6% in 2011, not so different
from the 2005 number at 10.1%.
These ratios improved steadily, especially after the company began the GD policy in
2013, and in 2015, 13% of female regulars were listed as managers, 30% were
sogoshoku, and 57% were ippanshoku. The company also doubled the number of
female sogoshoku recruits to 30% of the total hires in 2015.
Besides sogoshoku and ippanshoku, there exist a vast number of non-regulars, called
nikkyu-gekkyusha (full-time, daily workers – who receive salaries and limited bonus),
nikkyu-sha (day workers, full-time or part-time, on speciﬁc contracts, no bonus, with
no job security) and jikankyu (hourly) workers who work on ad hoc or hourly base.
Nihon Seisansei Honbu(Japan Productivity Center) survey of 3000 companies
regarding the women’s motivation for upward career advancement (Nihon Seisansei
Honbu 2015) indicated that 70% of the companies that participated in the survey
replied that women’s own attitudes contributed to their lack of career advancement,
stating that even though chances for professional advancement exist, many women
do not consider career advancement and/or even remaining in employment an attractive or viable option. Thus, they blame the women’s lack of motivation, without changing the male-centric working conditions.
A 2017 survey of newly hired workers, by the same Japan Productivity Center, indicated that 30% of newly hired women wanted to become at least section chiefs. This
was quite an increase from the previous year’s ﬁgure of 18.9%. At the same time,
however, 29% of newly hired female workers in the 2017 survey did not wish to
become managers at all (up from 25.5%). Thus, the newly hired women’s attitudes
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toward career are being bifurcated. This phenomenon coincided with the attitudes of
all newly hired regulars, male and female regarding the work-life. Seventy-four percent
wanted to work for companies that offer only a few hours of overtime so that they
could enjoy their own free time. When asked about the reasons for them to work,
these youngsters replied that they work to enjoy life (41.5% up from 37%). This rate
(41.5%) was the highest since the survey started 44 years ago. Only 10% of the
young wished to become president. Instead of seeking promotion, they would rather
develop their own individual competence (33.2% up from 30% in 2016) (Nihon
Seisansei Honbu, 2017).
At the base of the above-mentioned Japanese young’s opinions lies a serious critique
of the conventional HR management. Until rather recently, large Japanese ﬁrms such
as Sekai exercised a highly male-centric system of hiring, evaluating and promoting
male and female workers, who were also categorically and ﬁnancially differentiated.
Leaving a majority of female workers as non-careers or as non-regular contractual
workers, management also valorized (mostly male) sogoshoku employees and male
managers’ total dedication to work. These people had no choice but to accept any
task assignments and job transfers, requests for overtime and weekend work, in
exchange of long-term job security, tenure, and seniority-based promotion. Those
who prospered such employment arrangements to become the executives tended to
approve this gendered arrangements, values, and ideas, because organizational
norms were also directly linked to societal norms that applauded the masculine validity as a bread-earner, and approved the gendered division of labor in production
and reproduction.
Thus, a serious attempt at introducing organizational transformation for gender
equality requires a serious retooling of the above-mentioned, entrenched habitus of
business men and women.
After several karoshi (death by overwork) by exhausted workers were reported, even
among large ﬁrms such as Dentsu, Japan’s labor bureaus fortiﬁed its auditing power to
enforce legal compliance regarding overwork. In 2017, the Ministry of Health and
Labor publicly announced a list of 330 companies that violated the labor laws. The
Ministry in a typically Japanese fashion launched a “shame campaign” by openly publicizing the wrong-doings of these companies, and declared that it would update the list
of “black companies” every month.
In addition, as Japan’s unemployment rate declined to 3% in 2016–2017, a severe
labor shortage was predicted, particularly in such labor-intensive industries as construction, logistics, service, transportation, and restaurant businesses. These ﬁrms
had to raise hourly wages, and yet they could no longer ﬁnd enough non-regular
helpers. Under these circumstances, Japanese management has ﬁnally begun to pay
more attention to improving working conditions for non-regulars and to adopting
more diversity-friendly policies.
In March 2014, the Employment Insurance Act was partially revised to facilitate
both men and women to take child care leave. The beneﬁt rate for paternity and maternity leave was consequently raised from 50% to 67% of wage for the ﬁrst six months of
the child care leave. These beneﬁts are tax exempt, and social insurance premiums are
also waived during child care leave. Therefore, the actual amount paid is around 80%
of the pre-leave take-home pay. In addition, the Act on Welfare of Workers Who Take
Care of Children or Other Family Members including Child Care and Family Care
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Leave was revised in March 2016, making it easier for people to balance their work
and child/family care. However, it is still overwhelmingly mothers who take parental
leave. Very rarely father takes such leave. In 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
launched a “work style reform” panel seeking to make time off more alluring for Japanese workers (Japan Times, 2017). The 22-member panel included 9 ministers and the
heads of Keidanren (The Japan Business Federation), and Rengo (the Japanese Trade
Union Confederation). In spring of 2017, the panel produced a report that recommended to revise labor laws capping overtime at 100 hours a month and improving
conditions for non-regular workers.
In 2016, josei katsuyaku sokushinn ho, or the Law to Promote Women was enacted.
The law that took full effect in spring of 2017 requires ﬁrms with more than 300
employees (numbering around 15,000 across the nation) to assess the ratio of
women in their recruitment and among the managerial ranks, to set numerical
targets to improve the ratios, and to publicly disclose plans to increase the number
of women in management.
The government also announced that it is essential for Japanese executives and managers to reform their work culture. The following chapter will show how Sekai Foods
in this political environment has attempted to modify its corporate culture, and its
members oft-unconscious bias to endorse the status quo, where the male should
work long hours to bring in corporate proﬁts, while female workers in general
should fulﬁll supporting functions and stay in the lower rungs of the corporate promotion ladder.
Sekai’s GD Implementation
The company began its diversity policy in 2013, partly to respond to the womanomics
initiative, but more importantly, to improve its corporate productivity and economic
performance. The most enthusiastic GD-supporter was its 70-year-old Chairman,
Mr Wataru Dote. In 2011, Chairman Dote became an outside board member of a progressive confectionary company that had already introduced GD initiatives and was
producing healthy bottom-line results. Mr Dote believed that GD would bring forth
productivity improvement, and in 2013 appointed a relatively young 54-year-old Mr
Muramachi as Sekai’s new President. At the same time, Dote and Muramachi
shared the CEO position. Together they began working on new ways of organizational
transformation.
Anthropologists tend to view the company that processes a unique web of symbols,
images, stories, meanings, lexicons, and myths every day. In 2013, all Sekai executives
were middle-aged men who had worked for the same company for many decades.
Sekai has been their only employer. The fact that they were executives meant that
they had built their career successfully and had developed a more or less integrated
schematic frame of reference or the habitus as to “how to think” and “how to feel”
as Sekai’s executives. Most of them saw little reason to change the system that had
given them personal success and reward. These Sekai men shared a stable and wellestablished “how to think/feel” connectivity.
Therefore, in order to transform such a mindset, one needs a drastic and impactful
jolt from the environment, such as a major culture shock. It must be compelling, not
too repulsive.
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In creating such a shock, Sekai leaders had to devise new signs, symbols, metaphors,
and tales that played key roles in new learning. First, the leader introduced a tale of
crisis and urgency.
The tale of threats was followed by a story of why Sekai needed a break from the
conventional mode of managing business. The message of eminent danger must be
given by magical messengers, who have to be highly respected and credible. Thus, it
is vital for a strong and visible leader to guide the people experiencing the cultural
shock.
At the time of collective crisis, the concept of magic is often invoked. When the very
existence of the community is threatened, a new level of consciousness can be raised
through advocating for “magical” or “unconventional practice”. Common examples
of magic are the miraculous restoration of health or protection from danger. In
order for magic to work, one must ﬁrst sense existential crisis or serious threats that
cannot be solved by the conventional methods and practices.
Chairman Dote had earned much credibility and respect, while President Muramachi gave new energy to break from the convention. They formulated crisis-magic messages, as well as a new lexicon in their effort to shift the people’s habitus. First, they
began inserting a new foreign word daiba-shitei or “diversity” routinely in their
speeches and reports. For example, Chairman Dote’s messages usually began with
his reﬂection about how the company was established some 60 years ago in the
ashes of post WWII Japan, how Sekai evolved and grew because of hard work of
employees, and how it now faced enormous challenges such as ﬁerce global competition, price wars, shrinking domestic markets, and technological shifts. Dote then
forewarned about the complacency of managers and workers, raising his tone and
noting that if Sekai continued to do business as usual, the company would soon die.
After emitting this strong message of crisis, his tone shifted as he introduced
reasons why Sekai men alone could not save the company and why tapping into the
underutilized talents of so many qualiﬁed Sekai women could give the company a
great boost of productivity and why diaba-shitei would foster inclusive growth in the
coming years. The chairman urged managers to abandon the old monolithic, malecentric, ways of endorsing the long hours of work, of regarding women merely as
their assistants, and valorizing the total dedication to the company, without healthy
work-life balance. The leader then asked them to emphasize productivity enhancement
instead of overtime, to open up promotional opportunities for capable women, and to
reinvent themselves as new human-centric leaders of change. Dote and Muramachi
then explained the diversity plan in some details, telling the audience that GD was
a readily available and effective measure to revitalize the organization. The new
policy aims at improving productivity per hour, eliminating unnecessary overtime,
creating a better work-life balance, producing innovative new products. Chairman
Dote then gave a message of hope, noting that with diversity plans the company
will be able to improve its core corporate values, uplift the ROAs and ROIs, offer challenging jobs, good pays, and job security to all employees, and fulﬁll its social responsibilities. He painted an idealistic and gloriﬁed image of Sekai’s promised land, where
the ﬁrm would become a successful global food manufacturer and that the next generation of Sekai people will be able to celebrate its 100th anniversary in 40 years.
All Sekai managers had to go through this “diversity” gig during corporate
rituals and ceremonial occasions such as the company’s annual ceremony to
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welcome new hires in April, weekly executive meetings, power breakfast meetings,
regional sales meetings, training seminars, and all-hands gatherings before employees got semi-annual bonuses. The Sekai key people were repeatedly and consistently
exposed to the daiba-shitei messages, and they were asked to relay these massages to
their own divisions and units.
The rank-and-ﬁle Sekai people felt that the direction of the company was somehow
shifting. However, most of them were not sure which way the company was going in
concrete terms. Very early in the following year, the two CEOs introduced two new
visibly impactful signs that shaken the existing patriarchal habitus, when two new
female directors, this author and the vice-director of R&D, were appointed as new
board members and walked into the previously all-male boardroom. The photos of
these women, their bios, and interview transcripts as well as the afore-mentioned Dspeeches by the top leaders were widely distributed via podcasts, home pages, inhouse magazines, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) documents, annual
reports, and other formal and informal media. Next, President Muramachi sent
another ground-breaking news, announcing the new appointment of Mrs Sakuragi
to become Sekai’s ﬁrst female Finance Executive Director or CFO. Mrs Sakuragi
was a 59-year-old divorced mother of two sons, who joined a small afﬁliated
company of Sekai as a bookkeeper. She was not only a woman but was a midcareer hire. Sakuragi was later transferred to Sekai’s production facilities and was
soon promoted to the section chief there, before becoming assistant director of the
human resource department at the head ofﬁce two years ago. She was to supervise
the compilation of all ﬁnancial reports, and to add her signature next to that of the
president in the ofﬁcial corporate reports and documents. In lieu of the ﬁrm’s seniority
promotion rule, her relatively quick rise was quite unconventional. Several male directors complained in private that she was very inexperienced and this appointment was
quite “premature”. Nevertheless, the promotion of these three women, one after
another, provided a very strong signal of change.
Every repetition of environmental stimuli such as the above-mentioned shocks to
the existing habitus deepens the managers’ learning and strengthens their brains’
new pathways of neurological connectivity. This process is called “brain plasticity”.
Studies of the brain plasticity show that the adult brain is much more ﬂexible and
capable of learning and growth than previously thought. Brain plasticity is directly
linked with development of new neural pathways and synaptic connectivity related
to new cultural learning and task accomplishment. These ﬁndings point to a potent
device for creating a breakthrough in the Sekai managers’ brains, for D-affordance.
According to Gibson, “affordance” is an action possibility available in the environment to an individual (1979).
More new signs of change were on their ways. Japan’s new Corporate Governance
Code encouraged companies to use external board membership. Thus, Sekai in 2015
added two external male directors. One was a US educated professor of marketing,
and the other businessman headed an international trading company, both of whom
were strong advocates of gender equality at work. The new composition of the corporate board disturbed Sekai executives’ conventional habitus for exclusively internal promotion of board members. As a result, Sekai’s newly created board in 2015 consisted
of 2 male and 1 female outside directors, 13 male and 1 female insiders, with 2 internal
male and 2 external male auditors.
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After the successful reshufﬂing of the board, Sekai top management identiﬁed
several junior female candidates and encouraged them to move up at least to the
section chief ’s position. However, this time, they hit resistance and protest, not so
much from male managers but from female candidates themselves. These sogoshoku
women would rather stay as they were doing the same work in the same division in
the same work location. They did not want promotion nor job transfers. Many of
them did not feel conﬁdent deliver an appropriate performance, and/or feel uneasy
over the new obligations it would bring. Instead of pursuing careers, they preferred
to marry and have kids and to lead less stressful life, they said.
As the result, the following table of the ratio of female and male managers shows
that there was a very small increase in the number of female section chiefs, from 8
in 2015 to 10 in 2016. At the same time, one notices a rather dramatic decrease of
male section chiefs (from 193 in 2015 down to 176 in 2016), which artiﬁcially increased
the percentage of female section chiefs from 4.0% in 2015 to 5.4% in 2016. The percentage of female assistant directors stayed at 3.3%, and directors, 2.4% (Table 1).
In an interview with the author, Chairman Dote stated that he wished to increase
the percentage of female section chiefs to 10% by 2018. However, it turned out to
be far more difﬁcult that he had originally anticipated. To address this problem, the
company began several career-orientation seminars speciﬁcally targeting sogoshoku
and long-term ippanshoku women.
In tandem with the above efforts, Sekai leaders decided to launch a new Diversity
Promotion Committee in order to oversee the implementation of the GD task
plans. The company internally appointed 14 members from different departments,
with HR manager Nishikawa as the committee chair. Nishikawa was supported by
four executive advisors including the two female board members. The rest of the committee members came from personnel, CSR (corporate social responsibility), R&D,
ﬁeld operations, and an afﬁliate ﬁrm. There were a total of seven female members.
The committee met once a month for two hours, and discussion took more in the
form of information-sharing rather than generating strategies. During the ﬁrst few
meetings, the female participants tended to be reticent, not knowing where to turn.
Some male advisors on the other hand were vocal. One male advisor even suggested
that the GD campaign should focus on units with a large number of female managerial
cadres rather than targeting those with few females. Sekai’s units with more women
were mostly administrative, such as personnel, accounting, R&D, and logistics,
while the units with very few female managerial cadres, such as sales and manufacturing operations were considered as the company’s core units of proﬁt-making with fastcareer tracks. After the initial few committee meetings, some female participants
expressed in private that they were shocked by some male managers’ lack of understanding of the GD mission. Sensing a potential gender-based perception gap, the
committee agreed that the committee’s ﬁrst order of business should be fact-ﬁnding.
Consequently, it conducted a company-wide questionnaire survey regarding the
employee’s awareness of the new D-policy, opinions about the work climate, career
prospect, and job satisfaction. The committee examined the results by deploying a
SWOT analysis, evaluating the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
regarding Sekai people’s career motivation and gender equality at work.
The questionnaire surveys revealed that there was indeed gender gap in the above
items. Only 40% of full-time female regulars wanted to work until retirement, in
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Table 1. Sekai company’s numbers and percentages of managers 2014–2016
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contrast to almost 90% of male regulars. The degree of loyalty to the company by
females was about half of that of males. The survey ﬁndings revealed that there
existed many disparate understandings and methods of D-implementation at local
levels and that different units set different priorities, goals, and targets that might
not have anything to do with the D-policies that the committee was envisioning. Discussion as to whether the committee should use a centralized approach or encourage
local diversify. As for its very core idea of promoting women, they met backlash from
different quarters, where a large number of respondents stated that instead of focusing
on women, the new D-policy should tackle other key concerns of workers and managers. These key items included: the welfare of the senior (mostly male) workers and
single transfers who were done by mostly male sogoshoku and managers. They were
also concerned about the workers’ long working hours and excessive overtime.
These respondents argued that before one could reform gender issues for women,
there were so many other issues related to how they were asked to work. They proposed that the company should change its habitus to valorize Sekai men who prioritize
work for the company over everything else. The staff of some local units also complained that the D-bureaucrats of the head ofﬁce was overburdening the local unit
unnecessarily instead to encouraging them to concentrate their effort in proﬁtmaking. They argued that the committee should follow Sekai’s conventional way of
genba-shugi that focused on ﬁeld operations
While the D-committee, rather unsuccessfully, tried to amalgamate local units’ priorities into the organization-wide D-priorities envisioned by the committee,
Months went by as the committee members held a series of brain-storming sessions
and discussions to see if there was any way to resolve these issues. A comprehensive
GD-implementation plan was slow to materialize as the committee was meeting
once a month. Its slow progress frustrated the top leaders.
Despite the initially successful impact of emitting new GD-signs, the leaders realized that among the rank-and-ﬁle managers and employees, there still remained
much confusion about the main GD goal and its urgency.
The committee since its inception struggled to move forward for one and a half year.
Finally, Sekai leaders decided to disband the ineffectual D-committee and the chairman of the committee and Sekai’s HR director to an overseas subsidiary. This was
the ﬁrst of GD-related causalities.
Having realized that the monthly committee structure was ineffective, Sekai leaders
decided to create a more permanent ﬁxture. In early spring of 2016, the company
decided to establish a brand-new Diversity Promotion Ofﬁce and placed it under
the ofﬁce of President. Sekai also announced that the members of the newly created
D-ofﬁce would be recruited internally through nomination and self-nomination, and
that the ﬁnal selection would be made by a team of the top executives and president.
This internal and more transparent recruitment procedure was another sign of change
stirring up the conventional climate, where the personnel selection had been more
opaque and the ﬁnal decision had been left to the CEO.
Twenty-four people from diverse units applied with recommendations from
superiors. Seven were selected for the positions: They were three male sogoshoku,
each from personnel, R&D and compliance, and four female sogoshoku from logistics,
operation, product development and an afﬁliate company. The staff were headed by
newly promoted section Chief Miss Kazuko Sora who transferred from an operation
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division; assistant director Mr Yukihiko Sato who came from compliance department,
and board director Kiyoshi Kaku who used to be the head of the personnel division.
The D-staff enthusiastically began formulating institutional reform plans in a separate, glass-walled ofﬁce. Their workspace was another new arrangement because
other Sekai people continued to work in an open gymnasium-like ofﬁce space.
Their ﬁrst task was to respond to the Japanese government’s initiative for promoting
women in business. The new law required that companies with 301 or more employees
had to create a three-year positive action plan by April 2016, that they must set
numerical targets for promoting women in one of the following four areas: (1) increasing the share of women in recruitment; (2) reducing the difference in the duration of
employment between men and women; (3) decreasing overtime and keeping appropriate working hours to encourage work-life balance; and (4) increasing the ratio of
women in management positions. The government’s request was quite modest as the
company need to set target numbers only in one of the above-mentioned four areas.
After several deliberation sessions, Sekai’s action plan was completed and submitted to the Labor Bureau. Sekai’s action plan focused on increasing female recruitment, setting a new target of 30% of new recruits to be women, a jump from 10% to
15% in the past. In responding to the need to improve working conditions for both
men and women, Sekai’s action plan stated that the company would dramatically
reduce overtime. At the same time, it was noteworthy that the company chose not
to submit a target number for reducing the difference in employment years between
men and women and that the company set no target number to promote females to
managerial positions. The D-ofﬁce distributed the GD plan company-wide through
announcements, newsletters and corporate website.
In order to encourage women to think about long-term career choices, the ofﬁce
began organizing career-design seminars. These seminars encouraged pre-managerial
sogoshoku and some long-term ippanshoku female participants to create career and
life-plans as well as potential challenges and rewards. These seminars were well
received: Indeed, several ippanshoku women decided to apply for sogoshoku promotion
and two sogoshoku women decided to accept section-chief positions offered by the
management.
Encouraged by the initial success, the G-ofﬁce presented several “radical” proposals
to different divisions for feedback. The D reform proposals included: (1) abolishment
of the ippanshoku-sogoshoku divide, (2) reduction of overtime work, (3) enforcement of
paid holidays, (4) paternity leave (5) single-transfer reform, (6) new hiring programs to
recruit mid-careers from the open labor market, (7) revamping existing allowances,
and (8) more career training seminars for female workers.
During the ﬁrst year of its existence, the D-ofﬁce identiﬁed two major pillars of Dinitiatives: (1) to shift the mindset of key stakeholders (women and their bosses) by
training and education, by giving new signs and learning opportunities and (2) to
change existing human resources systems and programs.
Sekai’s conventional norm had been that Sekai men had to work long hours for the
company.
In order to give a major shock to the mindset that justiﬁed long working hours, the
D-ofﬁce asked the company to create a physical sign of change, in the form of a
massive security gate at the entrance that digitally recorded the comings and goings
of all employees and managers with ID cards. The data were regularly tabulated
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and sent to each department head who monitored the working hours of every departmental member. If the number exceeded the set target, the manager and director in
charge had to explain the reasons and to come up with a justiﬁcation for the overtime.
This strategy of having a visible gate with digital recording turned out to be quite
impactful. For those working in mobile settings (such as sales people), the log-in/
out system of their IT devices began to track their work hours accurately. The top
management then evaluated each head’s job performance in realizing the professed
corporate goal of reducing overtime. Soon after the implementation of this system,
overtime began to decrease that also saved the company money.
In addition to linking the manager’s evaluation to one of the GD goals of reducing
overtime, the company also implemented “no-overtime day” when everyone had to
leave the ofﬁce at the closing time of 5:30PM. Nobody was allowed to stay behind.
Feeling empowered by these successes, the D-ofﬁce moved to change several key
systems and programs that would directly affect the people’s work practice.
However, they faced much resistance in doing so. Major disputes between D-ofﬁce
and other units were exchanged in the following areas.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Tanshin-funin (single transfer) regulations and compensations,
Paternity (in addition to maternity) leaves,
Eldercare and family leaves,
Full utilization of paid vacation days,
Introduction of ﬂexible work hours,
Revision of other various human resource provisions.

Resistance and Rear Guards
Anthropologist Takie Lebra analyzed the Japanese cultural logics in detail (2003).
She suggests that in order to understand the collective psyche of Japanese people in
interaction with one another, the ﬁeld researcher should examine at least four dimensions of their cultural logic and political dimensions, namely the omote (front), soto
(outside), uchi (inside), and ura (backside). It is common in any organization that
back/rear-end stories contradict the formal front and publicly presented tales. A corporate ethnographer must dig out many uchi/ura (inside/backside) stories as organizational members make sense of social reality. Ethnography in its rich description must
be able to illustrate the relationship between the uchi/ura (inside/back) stories with
omote/soto (front/outside) accounts that organizational members generate.
Despite the apparent calm in Sekai’s omote/soto stories regarding the GD progress
for public consumption, internally and privately loud complaints and sense of antagonism against D-ofﬁce were expressed particularly from the staff of personnel, general
affairs, information technology and from plants and local ofﬁces. For example, some
personnel staff perceived that new D-kids had taken over consequential personnel
issues despite the fact the above reform items should have been determined by personnel department. The personnel experts grumbled that D-staff did not even have a courtesy to ask their advice prior to creating their “half-baked” proposal.
Many local units were extremely busy and they resented when the new D-ofﬁce in
the headquarters repeatedly asked them to provide detailed information. When
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local plant managers and sales ofﬁce staff read the D-proposal, they thought that the
proposal did not mesh well with the actual workings of their units. D-proposal did not
consider their needs, they complained. While the local unit could have reworked the Dproposal to ﬁt their own needs, they did not have time nor resources to do so. Complaints also came from the people of information technology who were inundated
with requests for data from D-ofﬁce.
Instead of confronting the D-ofﬁce directly and solving issues, or complaining to the
top, some units deployed covert forms of sabotage, by ignoring D-requests as non-priority items. After many months of waiting, the D-staff discovered that the original Dproposal were not even examined or read. While some D-ofﬁce staff regretted the fact
that they did not initiate more effective strategies for inter-unit collaboration, they also
realized that many other units saw them as being too aloof. D-ofﬁce staff felt that such
murahachibu (excommunication) of the newly created ofﬁce was totally unfair.
Anthropologist Takie Lebra suggested that the ﬁeld researcher should examine at
least four dimensions of the Japanese cultural logic in order to understand the motivation and the collective psyche of the people. These four dimensions are: the omote
(front), soto (outside), uchi (inside), and ura (backside) of the Japanese psyche at
work when they interact among themselves (Lebra, 2004). It is common in any organization to observe the co-existence of back/rear-end understanding of social reality
that may contradict formal front/public explanation. Corporate ethnography with participant observation and open-ended interviews can dig many uchi/ura (inside/backside) stories that members present in order to make sense of the reality in relation
to the omote/soto (front/outside) accounts that are for public consumption.
In the case of Sekai where schism between the D-ofﬁce and other units deepened,
members spread gossips and rumors throughout the organization exchanging many
uchi/ura stories. The author learned that the above-mentioned, inter-departmental disagreement was not only due to sectionalism. In a deeper sense, the above-mentioned
turf-battle also reﬂected a wider habitus gap between GD reformers and old-guards
defending the status quo. Those managers and directors who had successfully followed
the old HR rules to reach their current positions saw less need to changing the
convention.
Struggles under the surface continued for almost a year. In spring of 2017, GD
Director Kaku was asked to present the progress so far and his future GD plan to
the corporate board. His presentation revealed that not a single HR reform project
had been implemented and that many reform items were still “in-progress”. The
board expressed strong dissatisfaction. Two external directors asked Chairman Dote
and President Muramachi to explain about Sekai’s very slow progress.
The blame went straight to Mr Kaku whose leadership quality was questioned.
Soon afterwards in May 2017 Mr Kaku was removed from the GD directorship
and was transferred to an afﬁliated company, a sign of demotion.
President Muramachi conﬁrmed publicly that he would appoint a new D-head
within a month and that the D-ofﬁce would continue its work as before. Chairman
Dote afﬁrmed that the leadership had wanted a much faster implementation of GD
policies and the new leader would be needed for that purpose. Despite these reassurances, Mr Kaku’s removal was a shocking blow to the morale of the D-ofﬁce staff.
They interpreted his demotion as the sign of the victory of other contending units,
and felt disempowered. Some became worried about the GD prospect and about
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their future career. Outside the D-ofﬁce many interpreted the fall of Kaku as a new
sign of D-trouble. D-sympathizers and female managers became more pessimistic
while D-opponents and opportunists sitting on the fence, grinned and waited for the
top leaders’ next move.
Cultural learning never progresses smoothly or linearly. Rather, it moves with ﬁts
and starts, frequently generating unexpected consequences.
About the time when Sekai announced Mr Kaku’s transfer in early 2017, an unusual
incident erupted among a previously voiceless people in the Logistics Department.
The incident initially had little to do with gender at work per se. It was about the company’s dress code. Let us examine the background of this incident, subsequent social
spectacles, and their symbolic signiﬁcance.
Background of the Jimufuku Dress Code
Like many large companies, Sekai recruited new school graduates annually, instead
of hiring mid-careers from an open labor market. After graduating from school or
college in March, the newly hired began initial corporate training and orientation
sessions together as members of the same corporate freshmen class. However,
there were some symbolic differences among the cohort because all male (sogoshoku
and ippanshoku) employees and sogoshoku women received a light blue jacket with
the company’s logo on the chest to wear while working. On the other hand, newly
hired female ippanshoku received two sets of white blouses, navy-color bow-ties,
blue vests, and blue skirts to wear in the ofﬁce. The HR director stated that
these clothes were not really the uniform but work-clothes or jimufuku. The
company nevertheless encouraged employees to wear the attire inside the
company building. If and when an ippanshoku woman became promoted to a
sogoshoku position, she would return the jimufuku and received a blue jacket
instead. In 2016, the cost of providing the two sets of jimufuku was about $300
per person.
The working day at the Sekai headquarters started promptly at 8:30 AM. When
most male employees, managers, and female sogoshoku arrive at the company building
in the morning, they put on the company jacket over their private clothes. Many took
off the blue jacket to go outside, and when they knew beforehand that they would go
out, they arrived in private clothes or business suits.
The situation for female ippanshoku was more complicated. In the morning most
ippanshoku women arrived at around 8:00AM or half an hour earlier than the ofﬁcial
start of the day, in diverse styles of private clothes. They then moved to the 8th ﬂoor
locker room where they spent at least 20 minutes changing into the afore-mentioned
jimufuku and putting on the name tag. They checked their ofﬁce attires in front of
the life-size mirror before going to their respective work ﬂoors to start the day at
8:30AM. At the end of work day, they repeated the same dress-changing process in
reverse and left the company gate at 5:30PM.
Some liked this engendered jimufuku ritual and others did not.10 For example, Ms
Keiko Yanagawa joined the company as ippanshoku three years ago upon graduating
from a private college. She did not like wearing jimufuku but had been tacitly but
strongly encouraged to wear jimufuku by her male superior and also by her female
co-workers.
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Ms Yanagawa noted:
Ippanshoku women, regardless of their seniority, had to wear jimufuku while ippanshoku
men did not need to do so. They just put on blue jackets. I don’t understand why only
women have to wear this old-fashioned ugly uniform as if we were high-school girls. I
am a fashionista. I like to wear business attires of my own choice. Wearing jimufuku is
demeaning.

On the other hand, 50-year-old ippanshoku Mrs Takayanagi stated:
I like wearing jimufuku. There is nothing wrong with it. Most of my colleagues like it too.
We also get them free. Very economical. We do not need to dirty our own clothes. I do not
see why some young women make such a big fuss over jimufuku.

Social Drama Initiated by Ippanshoku Working Mothers
According to Turner, social drama is deﬁned as “an eruption from the level surface of
ongoing social life, with its interactions, transactions, reciprocities, its customs making
for regular, orderly sequences of behavior” (Turner, 1985, p. 196). Turner’s social
drama theory has four phases of public action as follows: (1) The ﬁrst stage involves
breech of norm-governed social relations, followed by (2) crisis, during which the
breach tends to widen so that representatives of order had to grapple with such a
breech. (3) The third stage is redressive action that ranges from personal advice and
informal mediation or arbitration to formal legal process in order to resolve crisis
or to legitimate other modes of resolution, to the performance of public ritual. (4)
The ﬁnal phase is re-integration of the disturbed social group, or of the social recognition and legitimation of “irreparable schism” between the contesting parties (Turner,
1974). With the above theory of social drama in mind, let us examine a critical incident
in the logistics department initiated by ippanshoku working mothers.
Prior to 2016, Sekai’s logistics department had 1 male director, 2 male managers, 1
female section chief, 5 male and 3 female sogoshoku, 3 male and 11 female ippanshoku,
and 4 female haken (dispatched) workers, most of who had been working in the same
department for several years, each handling 3 or 4 accounts almost independently and
expertly. In 2015, three ippanshoku women became pregnant and took one-year maternity leave that substantially decreased the staff size. The reduced workforce toiled from
8:30 till 5:30 non-stop with one-hour lunch break.
In November 2016, Director Toyama announced that new haken-ho (Labor Law
concerning non-regular workers) was enacted in 2015. This law prohibited the
company to keep non-regular haken workers in the same positions for more than
three years without converting them to full-timers. Director Toyama noted that the
logistics’ four dispatched workers had worked in the same job for more than ﬁve
years. In order to comply with the new labor regulation, Sekai management had
decided to convert only one haken into a full-time position, and to dismiss the other
three haken part-timers. There was an audible gasp among the staff, because these
haken women, despite their non-regular and part-time status (with much lower
hourly wages) had carried the same workload as the full-time regulars, handling
more than 12 client-accounts on their own. The dismissal of these persons meant an
added workload onto the already over-worked employees. Director Toyama quickly
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added in his speech that the company would hire new personnel in April. However,
everyone knew that it would take several years of training before such a novice
would be able to handle complex logistic operations. When everyone was already overwhelmed with work, who would have time to train these newcomers?
Into this turmoil, three ippanshoku mothers came back to work after completing
their maternity leave. In compliance with the law, the company had already granted
these working mothers to work for shorter work hours (9:30–4:30). There was much
work to be done in the logistics department. Afternoon around 4:00–5:00 PM could
be quite chaotic when logistics staff answered calls and e-mails from clients, plant shipping departments and delivery companies to complete the last-minute businesses and/
or to handle emergencies. Other logistics employees complained in private that they
had to cover an additional volume of work left by these mothers, until the ofﬁcial
closing time of 5:30. These mothers felt guilty in causing “troubles” to their colleagues.
However, these mothers were also pressed time-wise because they had to juggle worklife responsibilities every day. At around 4:10 PM they stopped working, dashed to the
locker room to change jimufuku and ran to catch a commuter train to pick up their
babies at daycare centers. If they were late, these centers charged them penalty fees.
It was particularly onerous when their babies got sick, since they did not have any relative close-by to look after the sick babies at home. Their husbands were also working
overtime. They said that they were always harried and increasingly stressed. A month
after their return to work, the working mothers concluded that the 20-minutes jimufuku change twice a day was a waste of time.
One day in mid-February, the three mothers arrived at the work stations wearing
private clothes instead of jimufuku. Old-timers’ eyebrows were raised, sarcastic
remarks were murmured. Disapproving glances were cast in their direction. But
nobody said anything directly to them. However, female employees spread the jimufuku saga as a hot gossip topic throughout the organization, while men were unconcerned about bickering and criticism against mothers among ladies. Working
mothers continued to wear private clothes in the ofﬁce.
In late February, 63-year-old Senior Director Mr Kiyoshi Kawakami happened to
visit the logistics department. He immediately noticed the three women wearing
private clothes. He called in Logistics Director Toyama and commented on
Toyama’s insufﬁcient supervision over his employees. Kawakami stated that
Toyama had to draw a line (kejime) between acceptable and non-acceptable behaviors
at work. Toyama apologized profusely. He immediately called in and reprimanded the
three mothers, who felt distraught and humiliated. One cried in public. The publicly
displayed drama was witnessed by everyone in the open ofﬁce.
Soon, through the grapevine, different persons who were sympathetic to the plights
of these mothers informed the corporate compliance ofﬁcer, legal counsels, and the
staff of the D-ofﬁce. The legal counsel then advised Senior Director Kawakami in
private and pointed out that the enforcement of jimufuku only in a particular
segment of workers could be a possible violation of the labor law. Chairman and President also heard about this new development from their own female secretaries.
At the end, Director Kawakami and the top management agreed that the company’s
dress code had to be clariﬁed and that jimufuku should not be forced on ippanshoku
women. They requested the HR ofﬁce to create a new dress code for all employees.
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The symbolic revolt initiated by the working mothers led to an unusual collaboration between the D-ofﬁce and the personnel department. The two units collaborated
to create the process of redress and re-integration (Turner, 1974, 1985). Sekai management chose informal mediation, avoiding potential threats of litigation.
The re-integration phase in the logistics department included the recognition of
hard-working ippanshoku women. Director Toyama re-conﬁrmed that jimufuku was
not uniform. At the same time, in order to save the face of Senior Director Kawakami
and to legitimize the conventional corporate hierarchy, the company went ahead to
devise a new dress code, stating that people could wear private clothes with the company’s blue jacket, but that the company asks employees to look professional. The new
dress code argued that Sekai people should wear appropriate clothes suitable for their
politico-economic positionality.
Prior to the above-mentioned critical incident that threatened the status quo, it had
been the norm that Sekai’s managerial cadres as well as female sogoshoku “men–
women” wrapped their bodies in business suits or wore a company jacket and that
these attires symbolized their higher status in the organization. Ippanshoku working
mothers in a lower echelon on the other hand had to cover their maternal and lactating
bodies in jimufuku. They also had to go through the ritual of demarcating work-life
garbs twice a day. While in their work time–space, leaking liquid such as milk and
tear in public were considered taboos (Douglas, 1966, 1986, Gatrell et al., 2014). In
the childless, antiseptic, air-conditioned work time–space, mothers cannot attend to
their biological functions such as breast-milking. Professionals do not cry in public.
After this social drama, however, many ippanshoku women began wearing private
clothes of multiple insignias, showing signs of individual choice and taste. They
were quite noticeable in the ﬁrm’s gymnasium-like open ofﬁce where everyone could
observe everyone else’s attire choice, or more accurately everyone learned how to challenge the old rule. The ﬁeld researcher could assess the degree of shift in the ippanshoku
women’s dress habitus, while they continue to work within the largely unchanged
power hierarchy.
And yet an important shift took place after this social drama. Mr Hiroshi Hoshi had
been heading the personnel department, who had experienced inter-departmental division that haunted the ill-fated Director Kaku of the D-ofﬁce. After Mr Kaku’s departure, the CEOs observed the staff of the D-ofﬁce and the personnel department began
to collaborate more fully to devise the new dress code. Then the top leaders rather cleverly appointed Mr Hoshi to oversee both the D-ofﬁce and the personnel department,
in their hope to eliminate the old rivalry. The newly organized D-ofﬁce was incorporated into the larger inﬂuence and authority of the personnel department. Mr Hoshi
used to be one of the powerful rear-guard forces against the D-ofﬁce push for GD
reform. As he became responsible for the D-ofﬁce initiative, he earnestly began implementing several institutional reforms. During the rest of 2017, Mr Hoshi and his staff
worked earnestly to expand GD reform plans in such key areas as hiring, training, promotion and evaluation, tanshin-funin, job classiﬁcations, and beneﬁts. At the same
time, the staff organized brain-storming sessions with other units of the company as
well as establishing new GD training sessions.
Based on the above ethnographic study, we will examine key cultural elements
in Sekai’s GD-project toolkit in the following discussion. We will identify several
key domains for cultural transformation that may become applicable to other projects.
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Discussion: MRS-PARC
All of us have acquired certain patterns of neural connectivity in our brains through
previous enculturation and socialization through both positive and negative enforcement. The established neural connectivity in our brains allows us to think, feel,
express, remember, and act out their culture-speciﬁc values, identities, and modusoperandi in speciﬁc ways.
Therefore, it is important to devise new pedagogical methodology to shift the
habitus. The ﬁrst method adopted by the two leaders was to create impactful signs
and symbols to demonstrate the top’s strong commitment to revamp the conventional
ways of thinking and doing. New signs must be effectively executed through ideal
channels of communication, and the messages must be transmitted by credible messenger-magicians who have already earned the respect of the existing members.
Sekai’s leaders adopted various new signs that included: the term daiba-shitei followed
by the company-wide announcement of the new GD policy; the appointments of two
female board members and one female CFO to the top positions. The move to
promote women to top positions jolted the conventional thinking that had approved
the seniority rule, internal promotion and long years of service for moving up the
organization. Another big sign of change was the barrier gate and digital record-keepings of unnecessary overtime, recordings of employee work hours tied to managerial
accountabilities, creation of D-committee, creation of D-ofﬁce, promotion as well as
demotion of some GD-related personnel, and ﬁnally major reforms in institutional
practices such as hiring, training, evaluation, promotion, allowances, and beneﬁts.
We have noticed the importance of repeated exposure to cultural tasks such as GD
that actually helped shift the wiring of the brain of the manager. We have also
noticed unexpected outcomes and unforeseen developments as the GD policies
began taking shapes in the organization.
These will be summarized as MRS-PARC that stands for: M = magical messages
and messengers; R = rites of passage and rituals; S = signs and symbols; P = rewarding
GD task performances; A = clarifying alternatives and affordance; R = facing rear
guards and resistance; and C = communication, cooperation and complexity. MRSPARC is created to identify essential factors for retooling the existing habitus.
Magical Messages and Messengers (M)
We have learned that Sekai managers experienced new environmental stimuli in a well
scripted way. The script contained enough familiar plots and vocabulary to be
accepted by the learners’ current habitus. The magical messengers also had to be
credible to the member-learners. In Sekai Foods, magical messages were given
mostly by Chairman Dote, and later by his younger protégé President. The
message began with a tale of the company’s humble origin while acknowledging
the virtue of hard work and corporate unity. The script moved to a tale of the
looming crises and challenges that could not be solved by the conventional
wisdom (and the existing habitus of men only). Thus, a more unconventional
method (called GD) had to be adopted in order to attain success. The message of
a promised land at the 100th-year anniversary was a vital element in stirring up
the emotional commitment of the people. In setting the company’s long-term
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course of action for the future, the leaders declared, “Embrace the magic and let us
reach the star!”
Rites of Passage and Rituals (R)
Trainee-managers experienced the same or similar stimuli repeatedly and consistently
via organizational rituals and rites of passage. Rites of passage are ceremonies that
mark important transitional periods in a person’s life, and that usually involve teachings and ritual activities designed to strip individuals of their original roles (ritual
deaths) and prepare them for new roles (rebirth). Rites of passages are deﬁned as a
step toward a new beginning. During these rites, the participants were encouraged
to abandon the old way and embrace the new, to metaphorically die and get reborn.
Signs and Symbols (S)
The same and/or similar signs, symbols, and stories were repeated constantly and consistently. Signs usually contain multiple meanings and connotations, and are open to
diverse ways of interpretation and translation. Therefore, the signs and symbols
emitted by the leader had to be carefully devised, scripted, and delivered. After
issuing these signs, not only formal but informal communication channels were monitored and explored, in order to inﬂuence the interpretive activities of messages being
circulated throughout the organization.
Task Performance (P)
Managers had to accomplish speciﬁc tasks in relation to the new GD-message/stimuli.
D-task performance was identiﬁed as producing tangible positive or negative results
according to the set GD standard and goals. Linking the individual’s promotion or
demotion directly with GD accomplishments sent a strong message to everyone. The
people began to identify new organizational heroes and heroines as well as villains,
losers, and jesters, that in turn signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the individual brain’s connectome
development that often shifted behavioral manifestation and task performance.
Clarifying Alternatives and Affordance (A)
In order to progress in career, the manager-trainee needs to compare alternative routes
or strategies of action or non-action. There is a useful concept called “affordance” in
this regard. According to Gibson, “affordance” is an action possibility available in the
environment to an individual, independent of the individual’s ability to perceive this
possibility. Additionally, Norman discusses affordance as follows:
… the term affordance refers to the perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily
those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be used.
[…] Affordances provide strong clues to the operations of things. Plates are for
pushing. Knobs are for turning. Slots are for inserting things into. Balls are for throwing
or bouncing. When affordances are taken advantage of, the user knows what to do just by
looking: no picture, label, or instruction needed. (1988, p. 9)
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Norman deﬁnes an affordance as something of both actual and perceived properties.
An affordance exists relative to the action capabilities of particular actors. Therefore, to a
steep staircase can have an affordance of “climbing” by an athlete but not so to an old
person who is physically weak and therefore does not have the action possibility. Likewise, a steep corporate ladder cannot offer an affordance of “climbing” by a sogoshoku
or ippanshoku woman who sees too many pitfalls on the way to the summit. “Hidden
affordance” means that, although there are possibilities for action, these possibilities
are not yet perceived by the actor. Because hidden affordance contains not-yet-perceived
possibilities, such thinking can help change agents assessing the current ﬁeld with a new
vista, to discover and offer alternatives, such as new work-designs, better work-life
balance, idea innovations, and possible career outcomes, that are not yet materialized.11
Although originally conceived in individual psychology, this “affordance” concept
can be applied to the organizational-level analysis in the present ethnographic study.
For example, one could see the usefulness of the affordance concept when one examines how an ippanshoku woman wonders if she could afford to apply for promotion to
sogoshoku or not. In order to persuade the actor (ippanshoku woman in this case) to
“climb to sogoshoku”, one must ﬁrst give clear information about the degree of affordance of such action against non-action, and their positive/negative consequences over
time. If both the employee and her superior could explore her career choice together,
they might identify both pros and cons of alternatives, while making hidden affordance more salient. In Sekai’s example, most women did not seek managerial promotion because they thought they could not afford it, due to the company’s original
policies for long working hours, male-centric work habits, lack of work-life balance,
and disregard for diversity. Because Sekai management was willing to remove some
of the existing hurdles, and to encompass more diverse career trajectories, in
coming years, new possibilities of affordance can be presented to the manager-trainees, some of who may begin ascending the corporate hierarchy.
Facing Unforeseen Results, Rear Guards, and Resistance (R)
Organizational learning never progresses in a unilineal fashion. It almost always moves
with ﬁts and starts. One should expect many unforeseen results, positive and negative,
and face resistance and sabotage, often from unexpected corners. In defusing outright
resistance, key stakeholders in Sekai identiﬁed the most serious areas of contention,
while listening earnestly to the oppositional rear guards, in order to reach mutual satisfaction. When a serious and prolonged stalemate took place, top leaders had only a few
choices of action – either to change the negotiation platform, to change the key personnel, or to force a top-down verdict on both parties. Sekai’s top leaders used all of the
available devices, while maintaining the order of the existing power hierarchy.
Communication, Cooperation, and Complexity (C)
When the GD movement advanced to the next level, more activation pathways and
channels were sought, while a larger number of the people were enticed to join the
movement through various motivational tools and on-the-job training. Sekai’s
three-year-old GD program was to get expanded and to permeate in all units of the
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organization. This expansion and increased complexity would require a higher level of
communication and coordination among an increasing number of stakeholders.
The new framework of MRS-PARC aims at how the individual manager’s brains
can accommodate new and ﬁrmer neural passages for reformatting their perception
of reality and eventually for reconﬁguring and reforming GD challenges in organizational practice.
Notes
1. According to the Labor statistics published by the Japanese government, 11.3% of Japanese managers
(section chiefs and above) were women in 2014. In contrast, 47.1% of managers in the Philippines were
women; 43.4% in the US; 36.1% in France; 35.4% in Sweden; 33.8% in England; 33.7% in Singapore;
31% in Hong Kong; 28.8% in Germany; and 28.2% in Thailand.
2. Bourdieu sees power as culturally and symbolically created, and constantly re-legitimized through an
interplay of agency and structure. The main way this happens is through what he calls “habitus” or
socialized norms or tendencies that guide behavior and thinking. Habitus is the way society becomes
deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities
to think, feel and act in determinant ways, which then guide them. Through years of service and professionalization, Japanese managers possess certain kinds of habitus shared by fellow managers.
Navarro explains that habitus is created through a social, rather than individual process leading to patterns that are enduring and transferrable from one context to another, but that also shift in relation to
speciﬁc contexts and over time. Habitus “is not ﬁxed or permanent, and can be changed under unexpected situations” (underlined and italic by the author) (2006, p. 16). Habitus is neither a result of
free will, nor determined by structures, but created by a kind of interplay between the two over time:
dispositions that are both shaped by past events and structures, and that shape current practices and
structures and also, importantly, that condition our very perceptions of these (Bourdieu, 1984, p.
170). In this sense, habitus is created and reproduced unconsciously, “without any deliberate pursuit
of coherence … without any conscious concentration” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 170).
3. OECD (2017), Labor force participation rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/8a801325-en (Accessed on 3 May
2017). The labor force participation rates are calculated as the labor force divided by the total workingage population. The working-age population refers to people aged 15–64.
4. I would like to thank Sekai leaders and people for their personal support while I conducted this ethnographic study. Without their inputs, this study would have never come to fruition. My gratitude also goes
to the funding agencies for this research, that included the College of William and Mary Faculty
Research fund, Reves Center of International Studies, and the International Forum of Business an
Anthropology.
5. During the 1950s–1970s, companies “utilized” young women with low pay in assembly and clerical
work, who assisted male workers on life-long, and seniority-based employment scale. Young women
were encouraged to resign at the time of marriage, before their wages inched up due to seniority. The
companies replace them with a new batch of young female laborers. Meanwhile, the newly married
women who quit the job moved to “unpaid” family care at home, and they supported husbands who
continued to work as sole-bread earners. This highly gendered division of labor worked well for the
family who could ride Japan’s rapid economic growth in the 1960s to the late 1980s. However, during
a prolonged recession that followed, in the 1990s–2000s, even male workers began to ﬁnd it difﬁcult
to obtain long-term job security and steady wage-increase. Many families needed supplementary
income earned by wives.
6. The system of long-term job tenure for full-time male regulars was created when the life expectancy for
Japanese males was about 70 years old. Today the average life expectancy for men is 80.5, and for
women 86.8. Maintaining this system becomes increasingly costly for the ﬁrm.
7. The equal employment opportunity Law, enacted 1985 and took effect on 1 April 1986 initially lacked
teeth because it only required companies to make efforts against discriminatory treatment in the recruitment, hiring, assignment, and promotion of workers for gender-based reasons. However, a 1999 amendment legally banned such discrimination, while subsequent revisions have also prohibited indirect forms
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of discrimination in promotion as well as unfair treatment for reasons involving marriage, pregnancy
and childbirth.
Companies usually require women job candidates to commit to a track before hiring. In 2003, the
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) found this duality created only for female employees was “indirect discrimination”,
because it could be used to conceal gender discrimination.
Tanshin-funin, transfers continued to increase, and overseas single transfer, already a sizeable number:
about 250,000 in 1992, continued to rise, while Japanese production facilities moved to developing
countries. While tanshin-funin is rarely discussed in ofﬁcial documents, this form of personnel transfers
between distant locations is both obligatory and frequent. Tanshin-funin is perhaps an ultimate form of
paternal sacriﬁce to feed one’s family, and it disproportionately hits middle-aged men. A survey in the
private sector found that 81.8% of tanshin-funin men are age 40 or over. There is also a strong relationship between the husband’s age and home ownership, as well as a higher incidence of dependent elderly.
In my study of the overseas employees of one manufacturing operation in southern China, ﬁve middleaged tanshin-funin men lived together in a condominium purchased by the company. One man brought
his wife, but she returned home after seven days. According to my informants, common hazards of being
tanshin-funin were loneliness, poor mental health, poor diet and excessive drinking. Some also engaged
in extra-marital affairs or patronized prostitutes. A survey by the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce found that
more than half of male employees in their thirties and forties would prefer not to be transferred.
However, another survey found a surprisingly high degree of tolerance for the practice among
tanshin-funin wives: 43% stated that the separation was not damaging to their marriage, compared to
20% who confessed anxiety over the extended separation. Of course, this may reveal a “response
bias” (Japanese women are not supposed to complain) and the tradition of gaman (grin and bear it).
But it may also be that except for needing their husbands’ pay checks, Japanese women ﬁnd tanshinfunin much less stressful than men do.
When this anthropologist entered this ﬁrm as their ﬁrst outside female director, she as part of managerial team was given a jacket, given to male employees. However, she found the jacket’s cut tailored for
the male body was ill-ﬁtted to her curvy body, and felt uncomfortable. Thus, she continued to wear her
own clothes even in such occasions as corporate ceremonies and board meetings, where everyone (all
men) and the other female board member wore the jacket. This anthropologist-board member liked
to wear colorful red dresses and pants, and her attire-habitus must have been disruptive to the established Sekai normative practice, and possibly offensive to the eye of some conservative executives,
but no executives commented this to her. On the other hand, she was surprised that many younger
male and female workers commented on her private outﬁts. It took a while for her to learn that no
one was supposed to wear the company jacket outside of the company, particularly if one meets with
important clients or stakeholders. In such occasions, the attire should be a business suit and a tie, or
in her case a business suit. She then wondered what rules would apply to ippanshoku jimufuku when
they need to go out of the building, since it was not that easy to switch back and force jimufuku and
business attires.
The so-called affordance theory was originally developed in cognitive psychology to explain diverse
strategic actions and rationale taken by people. Affordances was deﬁned as all "action possibilities"
latent in the environment, objectively measurable and independent of the individual’s ability to recognize them, but always in relation to agents and therefore dependent on their capabilities. When one
receives enough information about affordability that one can afford to do something, a direct link
can be established between affordance perception and behavioral outcome.
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